Vladimir Putin used to be cautious as well as cunning. Now he’s gotten everyone’s attention by preparing to throw caution to the winds. Perhaps this is all grand theater. If so, the number of extras Putin has staged in Belarus and along Russia’s border with Ukraine is entirely excessive. Perhaps he’ll get something far less than his maximalist demands and declare victory without launching a new military offensive. Or he might seek modest additional territorial gains in eastern Ukraine. If so, he’s way over-prepared.
Putin’s military build up suggests grander ambitions — sending his troops and tanks racing to the Dnieper River, to Kiev’s doorstep. Their withdrawal could then be predicated on the removal of Ukraine’s pro-western leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, and the creation of a new government respectful of his wishes. Putin is aware of what could go wrong, but his grievances run deep and he’s thinking about what could go right.
The door for an exit strategy out of this crisis can be opened if Zelensky announces that Ukraine has no intention over the next decade to seek NATO membership. It would take that long, if not longer, for Ukraine to qualify for admittance. The Atlantic Alliance has already grown beyond its political and military coherence; a breather on further expansion is clearly warranted.
However this crisis plays out, it’s bad news for nuclear proliferation and arms control. The worst case is a war that generates mushroom clouds, but we are nowhere near the worst case. Lesser nuclear consequences are bad enough — and they are likely.
This is not a nuclear crisis for three reasons: First, Moscow enjoys overwhelming conventional advantages and has no need to use nuclear weapons. Second, nuclear weapons aren’t good for self defense in warfare, and Ukraine has none. And third, the United States will not fight on Ukrainian soil. Washington and some other NATO capitals are ready to help Ukrainians fight their own battles, but not to fight for them. More assistance is on the way.
Ukraine has no nuclear weapons because the Clinton administration helped Russia retrieve those it left behind after the Soviet Union imploded. In return, Ukraine received the assistance it needed to become a viable independent country. The denuclearization of Ukraine, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, helped prevent “loose” nukes and nuclear terrorism. It also paved the way for the indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty, one of the primary bulwarks against mushroom clouds.
Some people in and outside of Ukraine think that it was a mistake to remove nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory. It’s worth remembering, however, that control over these weapons was contested between Kiev and Moscow, and attempts by weak Ukrainian forces to seize them could have had very dangerous consequences. Besides, Ukraine didn’t have the money and expertise to maintain nuclear weapons or to keep them secure.
Ukraine’s fledgling government needed western economic and diplomatic help, and that help was predicated on denuclearization. In return for letting nuclear weapons leave the country, Kiev received security assurances — but not ironclad guarantees — from Moscow, Washington and London.
That was in 1994. Five years later, Boris Yeltsin handed Putin the keys to the castle. Then in 2008, President George W. Bush pressed NATO to allow Ukraine to join the alliance. In 2014, Ukrainians threw out a corrupt, pro-Russian leader. Then Putin lit matches to the paper Ukraine’s security assurances were written on. He took small bites out of eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea. Now he’s poised to invade the eastern third of the country.
If Putin authorizes a major offensive, Ukraine’s denuclearization will loom large, especially among states without nuclear weapons that look to Washington for protective cover. Some states hedge their bets about acquiring the bomb without actually making a command decision to do so. The most obvious case at present is Iran. Most of the slight hedgers have ties to the United States. They include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. In addition, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan are closely watching how the Ukrainian crisis plays out.
Much is riding on what Putin decides, and how much he gains or loses from his decision. If deterrent threats fail and Russian forces invade, punishment has to be severe. Otherwise, the message to onlookers will be that aggression pays, and that continued nuclear abstinence can be costly. The more Putin gains, the more nonproliferation and arms control will take hits. Hedging strategies will become more pronounced, and bilateral arms control negotiations between Washington and Moscow will be placed on hold.
Arms control succeeded spectacularly at the end of the Cold War, putting in place all of the key elements of a nuclear peace. Bad decisions by George W. Bush, Putin and Donald Trump have torn down much of this architecture. A major Russian offensive in Ukraine would make it ever harder to rebuild. And Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has designs on Taiwan and whose Olympic torchbearers — included a Uyghur whose compatriots are in “re-education” camps and an officer wounded in fighting along the disputed Indian border — has yet to be heard from.
